characteristics, then their marginal yields (rates of return) will be equal, when both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns are considered. In the much-discussed case of short-term government securities and government sanctioned fiat money, for example, the rate of interest on the security will equal the rate of interest paid on money (typically zero) plus the marginal convenience yield provided by money due to its transaction-facilitating properties. 2 An asset such as a working refrigerator can provide its owner with a lower rate of interest than a paper security without being sold off, for another example, because of the services that it provides. The same is true of a beautiful painting. If two assets have different risk characteristics, this type of relationship will be modified so that the riskier asset will command a somewhat higher marginal yield (relative to the other asset), but such considerations can often be neglected when comparing the yields of short term government securities and government provided paper money. For an extremely simple example of an optimizing derivation of this type of marginal yield equality, see McCallum (2000b) .
The second theoretical point involves the monetary transmission mechanism. In the literature to be discussed, it is typically assumed that control over short-term nominal interest rates is sufficient for monetary policy implementation. To begin with, if the central bank controls an overnight rate, then a 25 basis point increase will induce an increase of nearly 25 basis points in other short-term rates, and these will induce increases in longer rates since the latter are approximately equal to weighted averages of current and expected future short rates. Then if the economy is one in which inflation rates are slow to adjust, changes in nominal interest rates become changes in real interest rates, and these have real effects on real aspects of cyclical economic activity (e.g., on real output and employment). But even if the economy is one in which prices adjust very rapidly, the interest rate changes will have an impact on nominal aggregate demand and make it possible for the central bank to control inflation in the economy. In what follows, this position-that control over short-term nominal interest rates is sufficient for central-bank management of macroeconomic policywill be taken for granted. 
Economies with Very Little Money
Notable recent papers by Benjamin Friedman (1999) and Mervyn King (1999) Fed symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming. In addition, a set of papers on the topic appeared recently in a special issue of the New York Fed's Policy Review; these include articles by Woodford (2002 ), Marvin Goodfriend (2002 ), and Sandra Krieger (2002 . In the following paragraphs I will attempt to outline the main contours of the argument while adding my own evaluation and thoughts at several points. In the present section the discussion will focus on Friedman's argument, which does not involve the complete disappearance of money but instead conjectures that its quantitative importance could diminish to the point that central banks would lose the ability to reliably influence aggregate demand.
Base money includes, of course, both currency and bank reserves. Friedman's argument focuses on the latter, presumably because of the standard central bank practice of passively accommodating currency demand. One part of Friedman's argument is that advances in IT make it possible for buyers to make payments by transfer of bank balances of a type that are not subject to reserve requirements or even by transfer of account balances held with non-bank organizations. The likely occurrence of such advances is evidently accepted by all participants in the debate, but Woodford argues convincingly that the magnitude of required reserves is irrelevant. After all, several central banks-including those of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia-now operate successfully with systems that involve no reserve requirements. Overnight interest rates in these economies are controlled by means of "channel" arrangements, involving standing facilities that put both a floor and a ceiling on overnight rates. 4 These rates apply to reserve balances that banks hold with the central bank, not because reserves are legally required but because they are useful for settlement purposes (and to earn any interest that they pay).
Woodford's argument does not assume the existence of currency or reserve requirements so it applies quite generally, to any economy in which final payment settlements are mediated through balances held with the central bank (assuming that these balances serve as the MOA). 5 There is no necessity for currency to be used for transactions or for non-bank firms to be excluded from supplying transaction accounts.
A related but alternative arrangement involves central bank payment of interest on reserves. This possibility is discussed by Woodford (2000, pp. 242-244, 254-255) and is treated extensively by Goodfriend (2002) . If settlement reserves with the central bank are held by banks, along with overnight securities, then the interest rate on the latter will equal the sum of the interest rate paid on reserve balances plus the marginal service yield provided by these balances. 6 By adjusting the interest paid on reserves, then, the central bank can exert near-direct control over the overnight interest rate. The marginal service yield might adjust when the reserve rate is changed, but Goodfriend (2002, p. 78) points out that this complication can be eliminated if the central bank induces banks to hold reserves of such a large magnitude that the marginal (not average!) service yield has been driven down to zero (i.e., past the point of satiation). Then the overnight rate will adjust upward or downward point-for-point with the reserve-balance rate. 7 Goodfriend discusses several advantages, relative to current U.S. practice, of this approach to monetary policy implementation.
It is interesting and instructive to consider the feasibility of negative nominal interest rates on overnight loans under the interest on reserves setup. A negative rate on reserves is in principle possible-this amounts to levying a charge for holding settlement balances-and the sum of this rate plus a small marginal service yield can be negative. Thus the marginal equality of the previous paragraph seems to indicate that the overnight rate could be made significantly negative, and consequently that the payment of interest on reserves offers one approach for a central bank to conduct stabilization policy under conditions that call for negative nominal interest rates. The zero lower bound implied by this marginal equality is not a bound on nominal interest rates, but instead a bound on the difference between nominal interest rates on securities and on reserves. 8 This difference cannot go negative because it is equated, by optimizing asset holders, to the (nonnegative) real marginal service yield on settlement balances. The foregoing does not imply the possibility of significantly negative interest rates, however, if the economy is one in which currency (paying zero nominal interest) is held and used for transaction purposes. The reason is that another marginal equality also holds, one relating to overnight loans and currency. Since the interest rate on the former is equated, by optimizing asset holders, to the marginal service yield on currency, it can go negative only to the extent that the marginal service yield on currency can be driven negative. Presumably, however, this yield can be driven only a few basis points below zero-basically because storage of currency is very inexpensive; see McCallum (2000) .
Thus if the central bank made the interest rate on reserves strongly negative, their quantity would fall and overnight securities would cease to be held.
In the type of economy discussed to this point there exists some money. Currency may or may not be used for transactions by households or firms in general, but it is assumed that central bank settlement balances are used by banks and firms involved with final settlements. This transaction-facilitating money-central-bank settlement balances-serves both as a MOA and MOE. In the next section we move on to consideration of a more drastic case.
Economies with No Money
Specifically, we turn now to the more radical case discussed by King (1999 King ( , 2001 ).
currency (which will be a decreasing function of the real quantity held) equals the overnight interest rate. (This statement presumes that no explicit interest is paid on currency.)
The presumption then is that IT advances become so extensive that "there is no demand for settlement balances at the central bank because final settlement can be provided by the private sector" (King, 2001, p. 379) . Woodford (2001, pp. 254-259) argues that even in this case the central bank can control short-term interest rates by varying the rate of interest that it would pay on settlement balances kept at the central bank. In effect, the argument is that the overnight market rate will move together with the central bank's rate on reserves, as a result of the optimality condition for private asset holders that the overnight rate equals the reservebalance rate plus the marginal service yield on reserves (with the latter equaling zero).
9 Goodfriend (2002, p. 81) reaches the same conclusion.
The just-mentioned equality is necessary for private optimality, however, only under the proviso that private asset holders choose positive quantities of both of the assets in question. While I do not doubt the argument of Freedman (2000) to the effect that in actual practice central banks will continue to be dominant providers of settlement services for the foreseeable future, in principle it could be that private suppliers would supplant central banks in this activity (if, say, some private supplier had better computer programmers). 10 And with respect to that (unrealistic) case I find one part of Woodford's argument to be unsatisfactory in principle. That part is the statement that "the unit of account in a purely fiat system is defined in terms of the liabilities of the central bank" (2000, p. 257) . Certainly the liabilities of the central bank would be a leading contender for the role of MOA in an economy with no MOE, but there is no necessity that it be the one that prevails. Prices will, in a market economy, be quoted in terms of whatever medium most market participants find most convenient. Just as central bank currency can be supplanted by some other MOE if its supply is managed too badly (e.g., under hyperinflation conditions), the central bank's contender for the MOA can conceivably lose out to another medium. And it is the unit of account actually prevailing in market transactions that is of macroeconomic importance; it is stickiness in terms of prices used in actual transactions that is relevant for the definition of real rates of interest that influence aggregate demand.
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In this regard, let us consider the statement of King (1999, pp. 48-49) in which he says that "the choice of a unit of account (perhaps a commodity standard, which would produce broad stability in the price level) would be a matter for public choice and regulation, along the lines of existing weights and measures …." Now, it is certainly correct that there are public-good or collective aspects to the designation of a unit of account, and that a wellmanaged official entry should easily win any competition to become the prevailing UOA.
But if the national government designated the central bank's liabilities as the official UOA and the supply of these was mismanaged, it is possible that a privately provided commodity standard could supplant it. Specifically, it would be inconsistent with the principles of a market economy to have regulations forbidding the quotation of prices in terms of a unit of account other than one approved by some official body.
In any event, such an economy would be a non-monetary economy in the sense defined above. Thus there would be, strictly speaking, no monetary policy. Nevertheless 10 With respect to the realistic situation, Goodfriend's (2002) argument emphasizes that the central bank's role as provider of clearing services is thought to be contestable in practice largely because many central banks pay no interest on reserves, thereby taxing their own product whenever nominal rates are positive. 11 In this discussion I am taking it for granted that the relevant concept of "price level" in a non-monetary economy is that implied by the MOA. In McCallum (2000a) , it is suggested that the meaning of "price level" is questionable in an economy with no MOE.
there would be scope for different types of policy measures regarding price level behavior, with the price level being regarded as some general index of prices in terms of the UOA.
A Commodity-Bundle Monetary Standard
Let us consider, accordingly, King's (1999, p. 49) Fama (1980 Fama ( , 1983 , Greenfield and Yeager (1983) , Hall (1982 Hall ( , 1983 , and Yeager (1983), which is critically reviewed in McCallum (1985) . In several of these papers, and others that have followed, there is much emphasis on a commodity bundle chosen such that movements in its price would closely represent movements in a "general price level." It is argued by McCallum (1985) that Hall (1983) and Greenfield and Yeager (1983) are wrong in their suggestion that such a commodity bundle can be given MOA status by means of a simple, non-coercive definition. The suggestion in those papers is that if some official entity were merely to stipulate (non-coercively) that the value of one standard bundle might serve as the UOA, then there would be no need for any government (or private!) activity to enforce that definition in any manner. The mere definition would keep the price level, relevant for macroeconomic stability, constant over time, thereby ending problems both of inflation and inefficient cyclical variability.
It is my contention that this suggestion is too optimistic. One point is that viewing the designation of the unit of account as a pure convention, a matter of definition analogous to familiar definitions of units of length or time, is inappropriate. Thus the proper analogue to the choice of a unit of length (e.g., the meter or yard) is the choice of units in which to express quantities of the medium of account. It does not pertain to the choice of the commodity or type of paper asset or type of accounting entry to serve as the medium of account. Designation of the latter is not a matter of pure convention but instead a matter of substantive importance (McCallum, 1985, pp. 37-38) . It is true that given a MOA, the designation of a UOA is innocuous, but the designation of a MOA is not; it is analogous to the decision whether to measure the "size" of an object by its length, or height, or volume, or mass. 12 In particular, if the economy is a monetary economy, even one with only a little money, then the MOE will tend to be the MOA. And even if there is no MOE, about which the authors in question are somewhat ambivalent, then a non-coercive designation of the MOA would be extremely fragile, since the bookkeeping entries that serve as the MOA would not be claims to actual bundles.
More substantively, however, I believe that a suitably modified version of the Yeager-Greenfield scheme for monetary reform could in fact be viable. 13 To add to the realism of the discussion, let us assume that there will be some central bank currency in use and that this currency is the MOA, with "dollars" the UOA. 14 Now suppose that the central bank seeks to keep the price of a broad standard bundle of goods and services constant at the value P*. Next, suppose in addition that the central bank stood ready to exchange standard bundles for currency, or electronic claims to currency, at par.standard bundle could not depart significantly from P*. If the standard bundle were broad enough as to represent "the price level," then price-level stability would be automatically assured. The workings would be much like that of the gold standard, but the UOA price of a broad bundle of goods, rather than of gold, would be stabilized. 16 For a central bank to maintain stocks of a large variety of goods (and services?!?) would of course be difficult, so
Yeager (1985) and Yeager and Greenfield (1989) have stipulated that the central bank's exchanges would not be conducted in terms of physical bundles, but instead in the form of some redemption medium (e.g., gold or treasury bills) of equivalent value on current markets. With this modification, and with operation by a government-appointed central bank (or some alternative agency), the system would I believe be feasible and would keep the price of the comprehensive bundle close to a constant par value.
It has been argued by Schnadt and Whittaker (1993, 1995) that the provision for indirect convertibility (i.e., use of a redemption medium other than standard bundles themselves) would render the system inoperable, as it would give rise to unlimited arbitrage opportunities at the expense of the central bank. I believe that this difficulty, even if genuine, can be overcome. Rather than enter into a discussion of the type pursued by Schnadt and Whittaker (1993, 1995) and Greenfield, Woolsey, and Yeager (1995) , however, I will proceed by describing a system of the relevant type in a manner that is more closely related to current mainstream policy analysis. Accordingly, let P t be the dollar price in period t of a standard bundle (i.e., the summed price of its components) and let P* be the constant target value for that bundle. 17 The central bank does not buy and sell bundles themselves, but attempts to peg the bundle's price by buying and selling units of a redemption medium. Let the dollar price in period t of one unit of this medium be PR t . In each period, the central bank offers to buy and sell the redemption medium at a price that makes P t approximately equal to P*, in light of the previous period's value of a standard bundle in terms of the redemption medium, P t-1 /PR t-1 . Thus the bank sets its period-t redemption-medium price at PR t = P* PR t-1 /P t-1 . So if P t-1 > P*, then the central bank reduces the value at which it will buy or sell redemption units, relative to the value in period t-1, etc. Under this arrangement there is, I believe, no arbitrage possibility generated; the market price of the redemption medium in t will simply equal the value set by the central bank.
18
An interesting and practical special case to consider is one in which one-period government securities ("bonds") serve as the redemption medium. Then if we normalize by assuming that each of bonds these sells in t for PR t and is redeemed in t+1 for one dollar, the per-period rate of interest R t on such securities is given by 1/PR t = 1+R t . Substituting into the relation above, we obtain (1+R t ) -1 = P* (1+R t-1 ) -1 /P t-1 . Taking logs and using the approximation log(1+z) = z, we then have R t − R t-1 = p t-1 − p*, where p t = log P t and p* = log P*. Thus we have a policy rule that calls for an increase (decrease) in the one-period nominal interest rate when the previous period's price level exceeds (falls short of) the target price level.
Now, the precise adjustment rule just given might not be optimal, in terms of keeping P t close to P* and avoiding possible dynamic instability. But the exercise just conducted indicates that if there is any interest rate rule that satisfactorily stabilizes a price level around 17 There would be no analytical difference of any significance if we took P* to equal 1.0. 18 The central bank could utilize a small spread, of the type mentioned above in footnote 16. a constant target, then there is a corresponding rule for adjusting the buy-and-sell price of the redemption medium in a Yeager-Greenfield-type scheme, with short-term securities used as the redemption medium. The properties of such rules can be studied in macro/monetary models (with rational expectations, if desired) in the manner of today's standard monetary policy analysis, used for example in McCallum (2000b) and Woodford (2002b) . Several questions remain, clearly, regarding a desirable form for the rule, the length of a period, the use of buy-sell spreads such as those defined above by δ 1 and δ 2 , etc., but the outline for a method of studying these seems to be available. In particular, it should be possible to consider the issue of whether it would be better to have an automatic adjustment mechanism that keeps the price level as close as possible to some constant target, or alternatively to specify a somewhat gradual return toward the target after some shock has driven the price level away. In an economy with sticky prices, it is possible that a rule with prompt return would entail greater departures of output and employment quantities from their (efficient) flexible-price levels, depending on the specifics of the sticky-price mechanism at work.
International Exchange Rates
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to add a few words concerning exchange rate issues, since monetary policy and exchange rate management are intimately related. Indeed, while it is not quite true that they are simply different aspects of a single policy, that proposition comes closer to being true than the notion that they reflect two genuinely distinct macroeconomic policy tools. Indeed, from a long run perspective it is the case that monetary policy and exchange rate policy are but two aspects of one policy-for any stipulated pattern of behavior for a country's exchange rate can be accomplished only by subordinating monetary policy to that goal.
It is well known that during recent years professional opinion has moved toward the position that the only truly viable exchange rate regimes, for most countries, are either (i) a floating rate that leaves monetary policy available for assignment to domestic objectives or
(ii) membership in a currency union with a common currency and a single monetary policy that is applicable to all members. This position reflects Milton Friedman's (1953) pioneering argument-i.e., that the self-destructive speculative inducements of a "fixed but adjustable exchange rate" make such a system worse than either extreme (i) or (ii)-and it also takes cognizance of actual experiences of the most recent decade in Europe, Asia, and South
America. My own opinion is that this position is justified-see McCallum (1999)-and I do not expect that continuing developments in IT will overturn it during the next few decades.
Such developments may push the world's optimal number of currencies somewhat closer to 1.0, but will not reach that limit. Goodfriend (1999) .
Conclusions
An extremely brief and non-nuanced statement of this paper's conclusions is as follows.
(1) Medium-of-exchange money will not totally disappear in the foreseeable future, although the quantity of base money-currency and bank reserves-may continue to decline in relation to the volume of economic activity. (2) In economies with very little money (e.g., no currency but bank settlement balances at the central bank), monetary policy will be conducted much as at present by activist adjustment of overnight interest rates. Operating procedures will be different, however, for some economies including the United States.
Payment of interest on reserves is likely to become the norm. 20 These different vintages would result from adjustments of the type mentioned in the previous footnote.
